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Comments
Immunity and Subrogation in Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation after Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail
Corp.: Too Absolute a Victory for the Employer?*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 the Pennsylvania legislature amended section 303 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act' to free the employer from liability
to third parties for contribution or indemnity in case of an injured
employee's successful third-party action.
Prior to the amendment of section 303, Pennsylvania courts had
held that the employer could be joined by the third party for the
purpose of determining the existence of negligence on the em-
ployer's part. If, by way of this joinder, the third party was able to
establish negligence on the employer's part, the employer would be
* The author wishes to thank Michael E. Relich, Michael D. Sherman and Joseph F.
Grochmal of the Pittsburgh law firm of Fried, Kane, Walters & Zuschlag for their helpful
comments and suggestions, as well as for providing some of the materials used in this
comment.
1. PA. STAT. AmN. tit. 77, § 481 (Purdon 1983). The amendment constitutes part (b) of
the section. Section 303 in its entirety provides as follows:
(a) The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any
and all other liability to such employees, his legal representative, husband or wife,
parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any ac-
tion at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in section
301(c)(1) and (2) or occupational disease as defined in section 108.
(b) In the event injury or death to any employe is cause by a third party, then such
employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin,
and anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages by reason thereof, may bring their
action at law against such third party, but the employer, his insurance carrier, their
servants and agents, employees, representatives acting on their behalf or at their re-
quest shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity in
any action at law, or otherwise, unless liability for such damages, contribution, or
indemnity shall be expressly provided for in a written contract entered into by the
party alleged to be liable prior to the date of the occurrence which gave rise to the
action.
Id.
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liable for the pro rata share of the gross damages, though this
amount could never exceed the amount of the employer's work-
men's compensation liability.' Since the suing employee was inva-
riably receiving compensation payments, this reduction of the
third party's liability accomplished the equitable result of prevent-
ing the employee from achieving a double recovery.3 At the same
time, making the employer liable up to the amount of its statutory
liability effectively barred the employer from asserting its subroga-
tion rights.4 This latter result was thought proper since subroga-
tion was held to be an equitable doctrine, the benefits of which
could not be received by a party with unclean-negligent-hands. 5
By freeing the employer from liability, the 1974 amendment was
bound to alter this scheme. Over the past ten years the courts have
interpreted section 303(b) to forbid joinder of the employer, and,
in the presence of the employer's statutory right to subrogation, a
position of considerable advantage has accrued to the employer.
This result and the abolition of the former scheme have come
under frequent attack.'
2. Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155
A.2d 836 (1959).
3, See Brown, 397 Pa. at 463, 155 A.2d at 840.
4. The employer's right to subrogation is statutorily provided for in section 319 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Purdon 1983), which provides
in pertinent part, as follows:
Where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the act or omission of
a third party, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employe, his per-
sonal representative, his estate or his dependents, against such third party to the
extent of the compensation payable under this article by the employer; reasonable
attorney's fees and other proper disbursements incurred in obtaining a recovery or in
effecting a compromise settlement shall be prorated between the employer and em-
ployee, his personal representative, his estate or his dependents. The employer shall
pay that proportion of the attorney's fees and other proper disbursements that the
amount of compensation paid or payable at the time of recovery or settlement bears
to the total recovery or settlement. Any recovery against such third person in excess
of the compensation theretofore paid by the employer shall be paid forthwith to the
employee, his personal representative, his estate or his dependents, and shall be
treated as an advance payment by the employer on account of any future install-
ments of compensation.
Id.
5. See Stark v. Posh Const. Co., 192 Pa. Super. 409, 162 A.2d 9 (1960). This scheme
was unique among the states and was much vaunted as the "Pennsylvania Rule". For a full
explication of the origin and judicial rationale of the rule, see Mitchell, Products Liability,
Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 349, 385-89 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Farage & McDaid, Annual Survey of Pennsylvania Legal Develop-
ments-Part I, PA. B.A.Q. 415, 417 (1978). See generally infra notes 121-81 and accompa-
nying text.
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In Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,7 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court issued its most recent reaffirmation of its expan-
sive interpretation of section 303, holding that the introduction of
comparative negligence into Pennsylvania law had no effect on the
section's operation.8 Heckendorn also held conclusively that the
employer's right to subrogation had been altered by the 1974
amendment of section 303: full subrogation to employee recoveries
is now permitted, the issue of employer negligence being "irrele-
vant" at the subrogation stage of workmen's compensation
proceedings.9
The complaint against the policy conclusively established in
Heckendorn's interpretation of sections 303 and 319 is clear: by
disallowing joinder of the employer, a third party sued by an in-
jured employee may be forced to pay a full recovery in the pres-
ence of a concurrently negligent employer. With the right of the
employer to subrogation now firmly established, critics of the pol-
icy maintain that this latter inequitable situation is worsened by
the employer recouping compensation payments when the em-
ployer might, in fact, be negligent. Though an equally inequitable
double recovery by the employee is prevented, as under the former
scheme, the critics of the policy created in Heckendorn charge that
the result is "too absolute a victory for the employer."' 0
This comment will examine the merits of this assertion. It will
first examine and criticize the case development which has tran-
spired since the amendment to section 303 and which has
culminated with Heckendorn. Next, the criticisms of the new
Pennsylvania rule will be considered. In connection with this latter
consideration, this comment will seek to determine whether, in the
balance of the values involved in this issue, "too absolute a vic-
tory" is in fact being won.
7. - Pa. -, 465 A.2d 609 (1983).
8. Id. at 612.
9. Id. at 613.
10. See Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Em-
ployer, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 351, 366 (1970); See also Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review,
1980, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 718, 741 (1981).
For more general commentary of this topic, see Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against
Workers' Compensation Employer, 1982 DuKE L.J. 483 (1982) (discussing, among other
things, the "Former Pennsylvania Rule"); Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where
Compensation-Covered Employers Are Negligent-Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead?, 4
HOFsTRA L. REV. 571 (1976); Comment, Employer Subrogation: The Effect of Injured Em-
ployee Negligence in Workers' Compensation/Third Party Actions, 18 SAN DiEGo L. REv.
301 (1981); Comment, New Policies Bearing on the Negligent Employer's Immunity From
Loss-Sharing, 29 Ma. L. REv. 243 (1978).
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 303(b)
A. Early Constructions and the Constitutionality Issue
The legislature's enactment of section 303(b) was accompanied
by little legislative history.1 Because Pennsylvania was so well
known as one of the few states which provided some relief to the
third-party defendant,12 however, it was immediately apparent
that the new statute was neither an enactment of the pre-existing
scheme nor a mere procedural modification. 3
In Hefferin v. Stempkowski, 14 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
attributed the amendment to recommendations of the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, which, the
court claimed, had prompted the legislature to undertake a major
overhaul of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In Hefferin the
court was faced for the first time with the issue of whether the
statute, which provides only that the employer "shall not be liable
to a third party," barred the joinder of the employer as an addi-
tional defendant.15 The court pointed out that the National Com-
mission had characterized as "essential" that workmen's compen-
sation benefits be the exclusive liability of employers and
maintained that the amendment was made directly pursuant to
this recommendation.' Accordingly, the court held that the legis-
11. Cf. Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 262 Pa. Super. 417, 439, 396 A.2d
1241, 1252 (1978), (Spaeth, J., dissenting) aff'd, 488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980).
12. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
13. See Scherch v. Miller, 15 Lebanon Co. L.J. 189, 75 D. & C.2d 87 (1975) (1974
amendment altered the rights of parties and was thus substantive; application of section
held to be prospective only). See also Clark v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Browne v. Wheel-Horse Prods., Inc., 408 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see Hef-
ferin v. Stempkowski, 247 Pa. Super. 366, 372 A.2d 869 (1977), where the court reversed a
common pleas court ruling that the "1974 amendment was merely a recitation of the current
law." 247 Pa. Super. at 369, 372 A.2d at 871.
14. 247 Pa. Super. 366, 372 A.2d 869 (1977).
15. Id. at 369, 372 A.2d at 870.
16. Id. at 368-69, 372 A.2d at 871. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (July 1972) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT]. The court's attributing of the amendment to the Commission recommen-
dations is no doubt correct, but the actual recommendations, when read in context with the
rest of the Report do not conclusively support the contention that the commission would
have thought essential that the employer be free of liability in cases of employee third-party
actions.
Recommendation 2.18, cited by the Hefferin court, reads as follows: "We recommend that
workmen's compensation benefits be the exclusive liability of an employer when an em-
ployee is impaired or dies because of a work-related injury or disease." REPORT at 52.
This text is preceded, however, by a rejection of damage suits by workers against their
employers, indicating that this recommendation stems at least in part from the Commis-
sion's displeasure with the existence of state plans which still allowed workmen's compensa-
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lature intended the amendment to be, as far as the employer is
concerned, "a complete substitute for, not a supplement to, com-
mon law tort actions," and ruled that the employer was barred
from being joined under the statute.17 The court also stated that
the employer's right to subrogation "remained unchanged."'
'
A superior court panel was next faced with consideration of sec-
tion 303(b) in Arnold v. Borbonus.'e In Arnold the court reaffirmed
that the 1974 amendment "manifest[ed] a broad legislative intent
to bar the joinder of an employer as an additional defendant,"20
and disallowed such an attempt. The court also expanded on Hef-
ferin's language concerning subrogation, making it evident that
section 303 worked to bar joinder of the employer for purposes of
defeating its subrogation claim." Judge Spaeth, however, dis-
sented, alleging that the employer's right to subrogation always be-
ing guaranteed would create inequities in cases where there was
concurrent negligence.'2 He also charged that constitutional issues
tion to be optional. Cf. REPoRT at 199. Similarly, Recommendation 2.19, cited by the Hef-
ferin court as dealing with the employer's immunity, recommends only that "[ilmmunity
from negligence actions should be extended to any third party performing the normal func-
tions of an employer." Id. at 52.
In Tsarnas v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 262 Pa. Super. 417, 396 A.2d 1241 (1978),
Judge Spaeth objected to the use of these recommendations to support the amendment of
section 303. Id. at 439 n.2, 396 A.2d at 1252 n.2 (Spaeth, J., dissenting). Though he asserted
correctly that section 303 goes beyond the express content of Recommendations 2.18 and
2.19, Judge Spaeth's assertion that "we are left with a silent record of why [the statute] was
enacted," id., is overstated; the general recommendation of the Commission was toward lim-
itation of the employer's liability. And, when viewed in conjunction with the legislature's
concurrent increase in the average weekly compensation payment, made pursuant to an-
other Commission recommendation, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature was
applying the Commission recommendations. See also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
17. 247 Pa. Super. at 369, 372 A.2d at 871. The decision was followed by a federal
court a few months later. See Adamik v. Pullman Standard, 439 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Pa.
1977). Adamik briefly touches upon the Hefferin court's assertion that the legislature
adopted the language of Section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33
U.S.C. 901 et. seq., in its amendment of section 303. The former section grants the employer
total immunity from third-party actions and subrogates the employer to the extent of its
compensation lien, and was, according to the Hefferin court, specifically on the legislature's
mind when making the amendment. 247 Pa. Super. at 368-69, 372 A.2d at 871.
18. Despite this ruling, the issue of whether the employer's right to subrogation to
third party recoveries was not conclusively settled until Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 465 A.2d 609 (1983).
19. 257 Pa. Super. 110, 390 A.2d 271 (1978).
20. Id. at 114, 390 A.2d at 273.
21. See id. at 114 n.7, 390 A.2d at 272-73 & n.7.
22. Id. at 115, 390 A.2d at 273 (Spaeth J., concurring and dissenting). The scenario
which Judge Spaeth characterized as inequitable illustrates how unsettled the subrogation
issue was before Heckendorn. This scenario imagined by Judge Spaeth as ensuing with "the
employer's right to subrogation unchanged" (as held by the Hefferin and Arnold majorities),
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were raised by the Hefferin court's construction of section 303(b),
though noting that two federal courts had already rejected conten-
tions that the section was violative of equal protection under the
federal constitution.
Hefferin and Arnold were approved by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Bell v. Koppers Co. 24 In frequently quoted lan-
guage the court held that "section 303 . . . more than alters, it
obliterates [the third party's] cause of action. '25 The court, how-
ever, engaged in no analysis of the statute's origins or rationale be-
yond citing Hefferin for the proposition that section 303(b) "fore-
close[s] the adjudication of the liability of the employer. ' 26
No sooner had the full import of the amended section 303 be-
come clear when contentions that the section violated constitu-
tional principles began to reach the appellate courts. In Tsarnas v.
is as follows:
Since the employer is not-cannot be-a party to the suit, the third party cannot get
contribution from the employer commensurate with the employer's fault. The em-
ployee, on the other hand, may have the opportunity to recover twice: once by the full
judgment against the third party, and once through workmen's compensation; for if
the employer comes against the employee for subrogation, the employee may defend
on the ground that the employer was at fault and thus disabled from getting reim-
bursed through subrogation. If the employee fails, or is not permitted to prove the
employer's fault, the employer will recoup the workmen's compensation payments
and thus in the end pay nothing-despite having been at fault. Either outcome...
represents an injustice.
257 Pa. Super. at 117-18, 390 A.2d at 274. Part of Judge Spaeth's scenario presumes a sec-
ond judicial proceeding in which the employer and employee engage in re-litigation of liabil-
ity for the accident. This notion of a separate proceeding can be discerned elsewhere. See,
e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Richmond Mach. Co., 455 A.2d 686, 689-90 (1983); Kelly v. Carbo-
rundum Co., 307 Pa. Super. 361, 369, 453 A.2d 624, 628-29 (1982), affd, 470 A.2d 969 (1984).
Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 524, 412 A.2d 1094, 1099 (1980) (Lar-
sen, J., concurring). After Heckendorn, with its declaration that the "issue of the employer's
negligence is as irrelevant at the subrogation stage of the proceedings as it is at trial," 465
A.2d at 613, such suggestions of re-litigation and separate proceedings are clearly foreclosed.
For further discussion of this effect of Heckendorn, see infra notes 170-75 and accompany-
ing text.
23. 257 Pa. Super. 110, 119-20, 390 A.2d 271, 275-76. See Albrecht v. Pneuco Mach.
Co., 448 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Adamik v. Pullman Standard, 439 F. Supp. 784 (W.D.
Pa. 1977). Judge Spaeth suggested that article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
might also be violated by the amended section 303. 257 Pa. Super. 110, 120, 390 A.2d 271,
275-76. This issue was resolved by the supreme court in Tsarnas. See infra notes 53-67 and
accompanying text.
24. 481 Pa. 454, 392 A.2d 1380 (1980).
25. Id. at 458, 392 A.2d at 1382.
26. Id. The court in Bell apparently took for granted that joinder of the employer was
prohibited under section 303(b); the actual issue in the case was whether this change was
procedural or substantive. Id. Thus the court's language in this respect cannot be construed
as suggesting that the employer's liability was foreclosed vis-a-vis the employee; though af-
firming Hefferin, Bell did not even mention the subrogation issue.
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Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,27 the superior court was faced with
allegations that the section operated in violation of article I, sec-
tion 1128 and article III, section 1829 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, and of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The common pleas court had followed Hefferin and refused
to allow the joinder of an employer in its injured worker's third
party action. Upon review, the superior court was evenly divided
(3-3) and thus the lower court ruling was affirmed, but only after
Judge Spaeth had issued an extended criticism of the inequitable
policy which he thought was produced by the Hefferin and Bell
constructions of section 303.30
The prevailing judges, however, rejected the assertion that disal-
lowing joinder was violative of any constitutional tenet. The third
party had maintained that by disallowing his right to indemnity or
contribution from a concurrently negligent employer, section 303
violated its right to a remedy for an injury suffered. The court
thought this matter already settled, however, pointing out that the
Pennsylvania No-Fault Act, which also had abolished liability in
certain cases, survived a similar challenge "under article I, section
11.1 The logic in that controversy, adopted by the superior court
in Tsarnas, which works to reject the "open courts" challenge,
stems from a belief that changing societal conditions necessitate
and justify the modification of the common law, modification
27. 262 Pa. Super. 417, 396 A.2d 1241 (1978).
28. Id. at 421, 396 A.2d at 1242. Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides as follows:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against the Com-
monwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may
by law direct.
Id.
29. 262 Pa. Super. at 421, 396 A.2d at 1242. Article Ill, section 18 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers, or em-
ployers and employees jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employees
arising in the course of their employment, and for occupational diseases of employees,
whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault of
employer or employee, and fixing the basis of ascertainment of such compensation
and the maximum and minimum limits thereof, and providing special or general rem-
edies for the collection thereof, but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit
the amount to be recovered for injuries ....
Id.
30. 262 Pa. Super. at 433-43, 396 A.2d at 1249-54 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
31. 262 Pa. Super. at 422-23, 396 A.2d at 1243-45. See Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa.
387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
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which may, on occasion, extinguish certain rights.8 2 Because it has
been held that a "person has no property, no vested interest, in
any rule of common law," s this conclusion seems correct. 4
The assertion that section 303(b) contravened article III, section
18 was quickly disposed of, the court pointing out that if a cause of
action could be abolished in the presence of article I, section 11, it
would be specious to claim that another provision would make
such abolition improper.8 5 The equal protection claim under the
federal constitution was disposed of even more summarily.3 6
Judge Spaeth, as mentioned before, produced the most thought-
ful judicial criticism to date of section 303(b) and its interaction
with the subrogation provision, in writing in support of reversal.
3 7
Though agreeing with the prevailing judges that section 303 was
not violative of article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, he nonetheless found it violative of article I, section 11.38
Judge Spaeth undertook to use this section, however, not in re-
sponse to the third party defendant's assertion that section 303 de-
nied a forum for a claim to be presented, but to assert that the
section worked to deny equal protection. 9
This novel construction of article 1, section 11 originates in
Judge Spaeth's assertion that "[o]ur Constitution ...guarantees
that every person shall have a remedy by due course of law."' 0
Such guarantee is violated, Judge Spaeth maintained, when the
32. See Singer, 464 Pa. at 399, 346 A.2d at 903 (1975).
33. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
34. Judge Price, writing in support of reversal, cited Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa.
114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959), for the proposition that in Pennsylvania "common law remedies
should not be vitiated by the legislature without concurrently providing for some statutory
remedy." 262 Pa. Super. at 431, 396 A.2d at 1248 (Price, J., dissenting). While a state court
may, under a state constitutional provision, impose such a requirement on the legislature,
the prevailing judges were correct in their dismissing of this language as dicta. Id. at 424,
396 A.2d at 1244. See Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d
715 (1978). The supreme court has recently affirmed that the language in Dolan was, in fact,
extraneous and non-binding. Kline v. Arden Verner Co., - Pa. -, 469 A.2d 158, 160
(1983).
35. 262 Pa. Super. at 426, 396 A.2d at 1245. Judge Price, joined by Judge Van der
Voort, however, found both sections were violated by section 303(b). Id. at 427-33, 396 A.2d
at 1245-49 (Price, J., dissenting).
36. 262 Pa. Super. at 426-27, 396 A.2d at 1245.
37. Id. at 433-43, 396 A.2d at 1249-54 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 434, 396 A.2d at 1249.
39. Indeed, Judge Spaeth did not even mention Dolan, considered by the third party
and by Judge Price to be dispositive of the section's violation of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
40. 262 Pa. Super. at 434, 396 A.2d at 1249 (Spaeth, J., dissenting) (quoting constitu-
tional language, emphasis in original).
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legislature, without any clearly articulated motive, "abolishes a
cause of action for a particular group of people while recognizing it
for the public at large," with the result that a "culpable tortfeasor
is indemnified for his wrongdoing at the expense of a third
party."' 1 Because the preceding language, put forth ostensibly as a
standard of review, is nothing less than a statement of what Judge
Spaeth perceived as the effect of section 303(b), this entire method
of attacking the provision constitutes no more than a novel way by
which inequitable results could be explicated: what was perceived
in Arnold as only an inequitable policy is denounced again in
Judge Spaeth's Tsarnas dissent as violative of an equal protection
guarantee, constructed especially for the occasion in order to be
violated.
While doubt thus exists concerning the enduring utility of this
analysis, Judge Spaeth's exercise nonetheless elucidated the per-
ceived inequities of the statute's operation. Posed in equal protec-
tion terms, the objection was as follows:
In cases where the joint tortfeasor is not the employer of a victim protected
by the Workmen's Compensation Act and the general right to contribution
therefore obtains, the third party pays only the proportion of the victim's
recovery that equals the proportion that his causal negligence has to the
total causal negligence involved in the injury. In cases where section 481(b)
applies, the third party always pays the entire recovery."
This "discriminatory effect" is even more severe when the subro-
gation of the employer is considered, according to Judge Spaeth.
Where section 303 applies, he pointed out, not only does the third
party pay the recovery, but the employer is absolved from any lia-
bility whatsoever by way of its reimbursement under section 319 of
the Act.
43
Having identified the unequal treatment, Judge Spaeth contin-
ued his constitutional analysis by asserting that social and eco-
41. Id. at 434-35, 396 A.2d at 1249. Judge Spaeth first listed the specific effect which
he alleged would violate article I, section 11, and then announced that "[b]ecause these
circumstances all attended the enactment of § 481(b)," the latter statute was necessarily
unconstitutional. Id. In constructing this remedy by due course of law-equal protection
guarantee in such narrow terms, this novel interpretation of article I, section 11 is clearly
constructed especially to strike down only a single statute thought to have an unpalatable
result. So constructed and narrowly applied, this opportunity to utilize the Pennsylvania
Constitution as an independent source of legal principles must necessarily meet the fate of
"seeds which land upon rocky ground."
42. 262 Pa. Super. at 436, 396 A.2d at 1250.
43. Id. It is at this point that the equal protection attack on sections 303 and 319
breaks down. The real complaint at the subrogation juncture is one of simple unfairness,
rather than disparate treatment.
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nomic legislation creating unequal treatment must "substantially
further [a] statutory objective" and "must be legitimate and ar-
ticulated."' 44 Predictably, Judge Spaeth maintained that he could
discern neither legislative intent nor reasonable basis for the law,
an assertion which necessarily involved a denouncing of the Hef-
ferin court's finding that the statute was enacted pursuant to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission recommendations."
Though Judge Spaeth acknowledged that the employer may have
been freed from liability and joinder in the interests of economic
efficiency, 4' he was unwilling to allow such "speculation" to pro-
vide a legitimate constitutional basis for the statute.47 He was,
however, willing to discuss the matter, admitting that allowing the
statute to operate concurrently with the subrogation provision
would provide the employer with "greater certainty that [he] will
be subrogated to whatever recovery the injured employee obtains
from a third party tortfeasor."'4" Though this would vindicate the
"economic efficiency" rationale for the statute, Judge Spaeth dis-
counted this explanation as reflecting a plausible legislative mo-
tive, apparently in disbelief that the legislature would want to pro-
duce any discriminatory effect."
44. Id. at 438-39, 396 A.2d at 1251 (emphasis in original). This test is borrowed from
language utilized by the United States Supreme Court. Although Judge Spaeth maintained
that this standard is imposed by the Supreme Court in "a closely analogous area of the
law," id., the cases cited for the proposition deal, with one exception, with social legislation
and semi-suspect class legislation, not with pure economic legislation such as section 303(b).
See the cases collected at id., n.1, which include, among others, Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (disparate treatment of the elderly); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (disparate treatment of women); McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263 (1973) (disparate treatment of prisoners); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (unequal access to contraceptives).
While Pennsylvania courts are totally free to establish a "heightened scrutiny" standard
for examining economic legislation which produces disparate results, recourse to the latter
cases as theoretical justification would clearly be inappropriate. In the meantime, the actual
Pennsylvania standard applied when considering purely economic equal protection issues
consists of posing the requirement that "the distinctions drawn have some rational relation-
ship to a proper state purpose." Baltimore and O.R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth Dept. of Labor
and Industry, 461 Pa. 68, 83, 334 A.2d 636, 643 (1975). See also Laudenberger v. Port Au-
thority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 70 & n.13, 436 A.2d 147, 156-57 & n.13 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Bottchenbaugh, 306 Pa. Super. 406, 410-11, 452 A.2d 789, 791 (1982).
45. 262 Pa. Super. at 439 n.2, 396 A.2d at 1252 n.2.
46. Id. at 440-41, 396 A.2d at 1252 (citing Adamik, 439 F. Supp. at 786).
47. 262 Pa. Super. at 441, 396 A.2d at 1253.
48. Id.
49. Id. By provisionally accepting that a reasonable basis for the discriminatory treat-
ment existed, the suggestion was thus made that the statute was constitutional. The subse-
quent discarding of the ascertained "reasonable basis"--on the grounds that the statute
would produce discrimination-results in reasoning which can only be described as circular.
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In completing his equal protection analysis, Judge Spaeth re-
jected the prevailing judges' assertion that the third party was not
unfairly treated under the statute because of the ability to provide
contractually for contribution or indemnification before the occur-
rence which gives rise to the action. Such an argument, he as-
serted, was meritless in that "in many, if not in most, instances,
the third party and the employer will not be in a contractual rela-
tionship; thus it will be impossible for the third party to protect
himself."50 This latter assertion on Judge Spaeth's part is subject
to question. Most critics of immunity sections such as section 303
concentrate on the alleged injustice which they cause in product
liability actions stemming from industrial accidents. 51 In these
cases there is at least the opportunity for such contractual agree-
ment, as exemplified by instances where the employer has pur-
chased a piece of machinery or a work tool from the third party.
5
2
Where the third party is a total stranger to the employer, on the
other hand, the circumstances are often such that the employer is
free from negligence. This latter case is illustrated by the driver-
employee who is killed or injured in a motor vehicle accident
caused by a third party's negligence.
While Judge Spaeth's destruction of his equal protection straw-
man certainly clarified the alleged inequity of the statute's opera-
tion, it failed to impress the supreme court on appeal.53 The court,
in an opinion by Justice Flaherty, did address the equal protection
issue surrounding section 303, but did so purely within the context
of federal, rather than state, equal protection standards." Identify-
ing the section as affecting neither fundamental rights nor a sus-
pect class, the court thus inquired only "whether the classification
[is] patently arbitrary and bears no relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest."55 Because the court accepted the argument
that section 303 was enacted in the interest of economic effi-
ciency, 6 and, implicitly, because of the rationale offered in Hef-
50. Id. at 442, 396 A.2d at 1253.
51. See e.g., Epstein, Coordination of Workers' Compensation Benefits with Tort
Damage Awards, 13 FORuM 464 (1978); Mitchell, supra note 5.
52. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
53. 488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980). For a synopsis and discussion of the supreme
court's consideration of Tsarnas, see Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1980, 54 TEMP.
L.Q. 718 (1981).
54. 488 Pa. at 521-23, 412 A.2d at 1098-99.
55. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973)).
56. 488 Pa. at 522, 412 A.2d at 1098 (citing Adamik, 439 F. Supp. at 786).
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ferin,57 the section withstood this analysis.
The court's consideration of the section with reference to article
1, section 11 was undertaken only in the latter's "open courts" con-
text, Justice Flaherty finding the provision not to be violated.5 8
This portion of the opinion may be said to be rather deficient.
While appreciative of the third party's argument that section 303
denied it access to courts to litigate claims, Justice Flaherty's re-
sponse was not that the legislature could legitimately abolish a
cause of action, as explained by the superior court, but merely that
the section had to be measured within the context of the Work-
men's Compensation Act.59 This assertion was followed by a reaf-
firmation of the Hefferin court's explanation of the statute's ori-
gins-as stemming from the legislature's resolve to conform to the
National Commission's recommendations." While these are, no
doubt, crucially valid points,6" they have little to do with the "open
courts" challenge posed under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
62
The court's review of section 303(b) in relation to article III, sec-
tion 18 was somewhat more judicious. Rejecting the third party's
claim that the statute was unconstitutional "because it has the ef-
fect of placing a zero dollar limit on the amount a third party can
recover from an employer," the court held that a "limitation"
could not be discerned where the legislature had, in fact, abolished
the right of contribution completely." This latter holding implic-
itly recognizes what should have been the court's articulated ra-
tionale in holding section 303(b) not violative of article I, section
11-that the legislature may, when thought necessary for purposes
of public policy, abolish a cause of action.
The court pointedly avoided a decision with respect to whether
the employer remained subrogated to employee recoveries.6 4 Jus-
tice Larsen, however, in a concurring opinion, stated that he joined
the opinion "with the condition that the employer's right to subro-
57. See 488 Pa. at 518-19, 412 A.2d at 1096-97. See Hefferin, 247 Pa. Super. at 368-69,
372 A.2d at 870-71.
58. 488 Pa. Super. at 518, 412 A.2d at 1096.
59. Id.
60. Id. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 138.
62. Equally as perplexing is why the court chose this portion of the opinion to fore-
shadow its ruling in Heckendorn with respect to the subrogation issue. 488 Pa. at 520 n.2,
412 A.2d at 1097 n.2.
63. Id. at 521, 412 A.2d at 1097-98. This explanation is the same as offered by the
superior court in its consideration of Tsarnas. See 262 Pa. Super. at 426, 396 A.2d at 1245.
64. 488 Pa. at 520 n.2, 412 A.2d at 1097 n.2.
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gation is not automatic," stating further that "[t]he employer must
in some judicial proceedings establish its freedom from fault in or-
der to be subrogated." 5 Justice Larsen's demand, repeated in
Heckendorn,6 was issued without adornment, in the latter case
stating only that a separate proceeding was necessary since "subro-
gation rights are always subject to equitable principles.
'6 7
B. Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail: Comparative Negligence
and Subrogation
The most recent area of judicial construction of section 303(b),
culminating in Heckendorn, involves the statute's operation in the
presence of Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute.68 While
65. Id. at 524, 412 A.2d at 1099 (Larsen, J., concurring). This brief assertion, repudi-
ated conclusively in Heckendorn, 465 A.2d at 613, was to have at least some influence in the
intervening period, cited tangentially as the law in at least one case. See Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Richmond Mach. Co., 455 A.2d 686, 689-90 (1983).
66. 465 A.2d at 613 (Larsen, J., concurring).
67. Id. One contemporary commentator upon Justice Larsen's concurrence in Tsarnas
pointed out that if the demand for a separate proceeding was respected, a result similar to
that of the old "Pennsylvania Rule" could be achieved within the confines of the amended
section 303 as construed in Tsarnas and Hefferin:
Several jurisdictions have adopted rules which permit reducing the employee's third
party's recovery by the amount of the employer's compensation obligation when the
employer's negligence has contributed to the injury. Adoption of this practice would
not violate the provision of section 303(b) which bars contribution, since the third
party would not need to claim contribution from the employer. It would be necessary,
of course, to prove the employer's negligence in order to deprive him of his right to
subrogation. As Justice Larsen suggested ... this would require some judicial pro-
ceeding. The employer would inevitably seek subrogation since he could not be bound
by an imputation of fault established in a proceeding to which he was not party.
Since under Hefferin and Tsarnas, the employer may not be made a party in the
employee's action, if the employer is to be precluded from subrogating and recovering
his compensation outlay, an additional action would be necessary to provide the em-
ployer with an opportunity to defend against the charge of negligence.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1980, supra note 10, at 732-34 (citations omitted).
For further discussion on the issue of the suggestion for a separate subrogation proceeding,
see infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
68. Pennsylvania adopted comparative negligence statutorily in 1976. See PA. CONS.
STAT. tit. 42, § 7102, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule-In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal
representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of
the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff shall be dismissed in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff.
(b) Recovery against joint defendants-Where recovery is allowed against more than
one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar
amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence at-
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Hefferin and its affirmances had made it clear that section 303(b)
worked to limit the joinder of the employer in order to impute lia-
bility, question continued with regard to whether joinder could be
had in order merely to apportion fault and thus reduce the third
party's liability.
The first courts to consider the issue arrived at different conclu-
sions. In Flack v. Calbrace,"9 a common pleas court maintained
that the intent of the Comparative Negligence Act would be sub-
verted if the employer was not made a party to the action, and
thus allowed joinder.70 Shortly thereafter another common pleas
court reached the same conclusion, maintaining, in addition, that
to so hold did not conflict with Hefferin's prohibition of joinder
under section 303(b), since the latter case was decided before the
introduction of comparative negligence.
Although other lower courts also took the preceding approach,7 3
several concluded that the Comparative Negligence Act made no
inroad upon the employer's freedom from joinder.74 Among the
tributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may re-
cover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the
plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more
than his percentage share may seek contribution.
Id.
69. 62 Westmoreland L.J. 137, 15 D. & C.3d 765 (1980).
70. Id. at 140, 15 D. & C.3d at 768-69. The court, however, considered only part (a)
and § 7102:
Given the plain meaning of the words "defendant or defendants against whom recov-
ery is sought" in the Pennsylvania Act, it is apparent that the employer and/or em-
ployee is a necessary party to the action if the original defendant is to have an accu-
rate determination of his comparative negligence.
62 Westmoreland L.J. at 140, 15 D. & C.3d at 769.
71. See Yeagley v. Metropolitan Edison Co., No. 3316 of 1979 (Lebanon County, May
13, 1980) (unreported decision). See also Prem v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 19 D. & C.3d
162 (1981) (employer ordered joined as involuntary plaintiff); Schaeffer v. Didde-Glaser,
Inc., 504 F. Supp. 613 (1980) (employer allowed as third party defendant).
72. Yeagley v. Metropolitan Edison Co., No. 3316 of 1979 (Lebanon County, May 13,
1980) (unreported decision) (cited in Getty v. Ajax Mfg. Corp., 129 P.L.J. 54, 56 (1981)).
73. See Schaeffer, 504 F. Supp. 613; Prem, 19 D. & C.3d 162.
74. See e.g., Shaner v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 483 F. Supp. 705 (1980). In Shaner the
district court construed Hefferin and Bell to render the employer completely immune from
suit as a party for any purpose. Id. at 708. See also Lawless v. Central Engineering, 502 F.
Supp. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The Lawless court undertook a more considered examination of
§ 7102 than did the Flack court, pointing out that "[b]ecause the first clause of subsection
(b) does not apply, the defendant cannot base his motion for joinder on the other language
of the clause." Id. at 311; see also Ryden v. Johns-Manville Prod., 518 F. Supp. 311, 316
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (comparative negligence statute "merely provides for apportionment among
those defendants against whom recovery is allowed.") (emphasis in original); Tookmanian v.
Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 505 F. Supp. 920, 922 (1981) ("clear and plain language" of
statutes forbade joinder for purposes of determining pro rate causal negligence among
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first of these courts was an Allegheny County Common Pleas court
which, in Getty v. Ajax Mfg. Corp.,75 held that the act neither al-
tered "any of the protections which section 303(b). . .affords the
employer [nor] provide[s] any benefits to the defendant who estab-
lishes that a third party immune from liability is also responsible
for a plaintiff's injuries. 176 This view was ultimately vindicated in
Heckendorn, but not until significant debate had been carried on
in the superior court."
This debate also forced the issue of the employer's subrogation
rights to be fully discussed. In Hefferin and Tsarnas, the initial
landmarks in the construction of section 303(b), the principle is-
sues facing the courts were the statute's general implications and
constitutional legitimacy; thus, while subrogation was commented
upon 8 and alluded to 9, the issue was never conclusively ruled
defendants).
75. 129 P.L.J. 54 (1981).
76. Id. at 56. The court was, in fact, doubtful that any purpose at all would be served
by permitting joinder of a totally immune party:
A finding that a party immune from liability was partially at fault will not reduce the
liability of the remaining joint tort feasors [sic]. The Act specifically provides that
where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, the plaintiff may recover
"the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plain-
tiff is not barred form recovery." Thus if it is found that a defendant was twenty-five
percent negligent and that a third party with total immunity was seventy-five percent
negligent, the third party defendant would be in no better position than if he were
found to be one hundred percent negligent because in both cases he must pay the full
amount of the judgment and the immunity provisions bar him from seeking any
contribution.
Id. at 58.
Although the preceding is true, the defendant in a third party action, from a strategic
point of view, still has reason to want the employer joined. Because the third party in such a
suit may often have its own liability reduced by demonstrating the employee's concurrent
negligence, the most complete picture available of the accident circumstances will be de-
sired; toward this end, joinder of the employer would allow an enhanced and expanded
discovery.
77. The first superior court consideration of the issue was in Heckendorn v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp., 293 Pa. Super. 474, 439 A.2d 674 (1981), in which it was held that joinder
could not be had despite the presence of the comparative negligence statute. See also infra
note 81 - 88 and accompanying text. The superior court's treatment of Heckendorn was
followed immediately thereafter in Leonard v. Harris, 290 Pa. Super. 370, 434 A.2d 798
(1981). Though the superior court debate was resolved only in 1983 by the supreme court's
review of Heckendorn, no superior court panel in the intervening period ever held that an
employer could be joined in order to determine pro rate shares of negligence.
78. See Hefferin, 247 Pa. Super. at 370, 372 A.2d at 871 (employer's right to subroga-
tion remains "unchanged" from that possessed prior to amendment of section 303).
79. See Tsarnas, 488 Pa. at 520 n.2, 412 A.2d at 1097 n.2 (issue with respect to
whether employer's right to subrogation "remained unimpaired" left "for another day").
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upon.80 In the face of a statutory scheme which apparently allowed
a possibly-negligent employer to gain full subrogation to employee
recoveries, however, courts considering the issue of joinder in the
face of comparative negligence tenets could evidently no longer
skirt the issue.
The superior court decisions which were rendered on this issue
before the supreme court's consideration of Heckendorn are, con-
sistent with that opinion, premised upon a principled reading of
the comparative negligence statute. As recognized by several lower
courts,81 section (b) of the statute contains limiting language which
proved pivotal in ensuring the continued freedom of the employer
even for purposes of apportioning fault. In the superior court's
consideration of Heckendorn,s2 it was pointed out that since the
supreme court had already ruled that section 303(b) "foreclosed
the adjudication of the liability of the employer," the latter party
could not, in the words of the comparative negligence statute, be
considered one against whom recovery is allowed. 3 The defendant
in Heckendorn had, however, conceded that the employer could
not be made liable for damages in the action, 4 and merely sought
joinder in order to apportion fault and improve the prospects of a
reduced verdict for which it was responsible. In response to this
assertion, the court claimed that the employer had "no stake in the
outcome of the action"' 5 and could not be considered-for any
purpose-a party joinable under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 2252(a), which
permits the joinder as additional defendants only. those persons "who
may be alone liable or liable over . . . or jointly and severally liable . . . or
who may be liable to the joining party on any cause of action which he may
have against the joined party. . . ." An employer fits into none of the cate-
gories envisioned by the rule, for the employer cannot be made liable either
to the plaintiff employee or to a defendant, third party tortfeasor."
The defendant had also argued that failure to include the em-
ployer in the comparative negligence calculus could allow the em-
ployer to be made whole by way of subrogation, though the em-
80. See supra note 18.
81. See supra note 74. -
82. 293 Pa. Super. 474, 439 A.2d 674 (1981).
83. Id. at 480-81, 439 A.2d at 677 (citing Bell v. Koppers Co., 481 Pa. 454, 392 A.2d
1380).
84. 293 Pa. Super. at 478, 439 A.2d at 676.




ployee's loss may have been due to negligence on the employer's
part.8" With respect to this matter, however, the court washed its
hands, claiming as did the Tsarnas court that the matter was best
left for another day.88
Subsequent superior court panels, however, faced with precisely
the same comparative negligence arguments, did not dispose of the
subrogation issue so glibly. In Kelly v. Carborundum Corp.a9 the
court followed Heckendorn and held that the prior appellate deci-
sions-Hefferin and its progeny- had not been "deprived of their
efficacy" 90 in prohibiting joinder by passage of the Comparative
Negligence Act. The court further asserted that joinder of the em-
ployer as an involuntary plaintiff, as sought by the defendant,
would be improper, as compulsory joinder is available only where
"an interest is joint and the holder of such interest refuses to
join."9' In explaining that the employer has no joint interest with
the employee, however, the court denied that the statutory subro-
gation right possessed by the employer was in any way "joint" with
the employee's claim, stating enigmatically that "[t]he interests of
the subrogee, if necessary, can be determined in a separate
action."92
This latter statement is open to two interpretations. First, it
may be construed as adopting Justice Larsen's assertion in
Tsarnas that there is no automatic right to subrogation, a separate
judicial proceeding being required in order for the employer to es-
tablish its freedom from fault.98 In the alternative, it may simply
87. Id. at 481, 439 A.2d at 678.
88. Id. at 482, 439 A.2d at 678.
89. 307 Pa. Super. 361, 453 A.2d 627 (1982).
90. 307 Pa. Super. at 366, 453 A.2d 627. See also Hall v. Goodman, - Pa. Super
456 A.2d 1029 (1983) (citing Heckendorn, employer "not a party whose negligence is to be
included in the apportionment of negligence"); Brozetti v. Hempt Bros., - Pa. Super. -,
456 A.2d 595 (1983) (citing Kelly, no joinder of employer available in order to apportion
causal negligence); Leonard v. Harris, 290 Pa. Super. 370, 434 A.2d 798 (1981), appeal de-
nied (December 21, 1981).
91. 307 Pa. Super. at 369, 453 A.2d at 628. Joinder of an involuntary plaintiff under
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is provided for in Pa. R.C.P. 2227, which reads as
follows:
(a) Persons having only a joint interest in the subject matter of an action must be
joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.
(b) If a person who must be joined as a plaintiff refuses to join, he shall, in a proper
case, be made a defendant or an involuntary plaintiff when the substantive law per-
mits such involuntary joinder.
PA. R.C.P. 2227.
92. 307 Pa. Super. at 369, 453 A.2d at 628-29.
93. 488 Pa. at 524, 412 A.2d at 1099 (Larsen, J., concurring).
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be construed as describing the situation which transpires when an
employee enjoying a successful third party recovery resists the em-
ployer's subrogation claim. In such instances it becomes necessary
for the employer, in a separate action before the workmen's com-
pensation referee, to present evidence of workmen's compensation
payments and of the employee's recovery. In such a forum, obvi-
ously, there is never consideration of negligence on the part of ei-
ther party. Regardless of the construction adopted, the court's lan-
guage must be dismissed as dicta, since the court also held that
joinder for purposes of apportioning fault was improper substan-
tively. 4 Still, the fact that the ambiguity existed at all demon-
strated the need for the supreme court to make a definitive ruling.
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Richmond Machine Co.,985 another
pre-Heckendorn decision, the ambiguity with respect to subroga-
tion was even more evident. The plaintiff in Richmond Machine
was the insurance carrier of an employer whose employee had been
injured and had received workmen's compensation benefits from
the plaintiff. 6 The employee had allegedly been injured due to a
defectively functioning machine, but brought no action against its
manufacturer. When the employee so demurred, the insurance car-
rier brought an assumpsit action alleging the manufacturer's negli-
gence and seeking indemnification and contribution in the amount
of its workmen's compensation payments.97 The court agreed with
the defendant that this claim was in fact one for subrogation,
pointing out further that it had been settled earlier that the in-
surer, in his own right, had no cause of action against a third party.
The carrier's action was therefore unsuccessful."
In justifying the rule that the insurer has no independent right
to pursue such a cause of action, the court provided a history of
both theoretical and pragmatic considerations. In earlier cases, the
theoretical consideration was stressed, with courts holding that
employer and insurer can vindicate their subrogation rights only
through an action brought in the name of the injured employee."
This requirement was explained as follows:
The right of action is for one indivisible wrong, and this abides in the in-
sured, through whom the insurer must work out his rights upon payment of
94. 307 Pa. Super. at 370, 453 A.2d at 629.
95. - Pa. Super. -, 455 A.2d 686 (1983).
96. Id. at 687.
97. Id. at 688.
98. Id. at 690.
99. Id. at 689.
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the insurance, the insurer being subrogated to the rights of the insured
upon payment being made. . . . This right of the insurer against such other
person is derived from the assured alone, and can be enforced in his right
only ... 100
More recent cases, according to the Richmond Machine court,
have restated this more pragmatically, the assertion being made
that the employer can be subrogated only after it is demonstrated
that the third party actually caused the injury and that a recovery
or settlement has been achieved. 101 This, in turn, can never be
100. Id. at 689. See Moltz v. Sherwood, 116 Pa. Super. 231, 234, 176 A. 842, 843
(1935). See also Hall v. Nashville & Chatanooga R.R. Co., 80 U.S. 367 (1872) (doctrine of
insurer subrogation is "dependant not at all upon privity of contract, but worked out
through the right of the creditor or owner" who is "considered but one person" with the
insurer).
101. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 14 Pa. Commw.
603, 609, 324 A.2d 813, 817 (1974). See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 222 Pa. Super. 546, 294 A.2d 913 (1972); Broderick v. Great Lakes Casualty Co.,
152 Pa. Super. 449, 33 A.2d 653 (1943). Travelers Insurance and Broderick raise important
questions concerning the employer's burden of proof in establishing its subrogation claim.
Both cases seem to suggest that the employer must, in order to be subrogated, establish not
only that a recovery has been had against a third party, but also that negligence on the
latter's part has been conclusively proven. Though the Richmond Machine court cites, in
dicta, these cases for such a proposition, this cannot be the law. Broderick, which provided
the basis for the decision in Travelers Insurance, was decided before the 1945 amendment
to section 319 which changed the language of the subrogation provision. As evident in the
Broderick opinion, 152 Pa. Super. at 451, 33 A.2d at 653, the pre-1945 statute provided, in
relevant portion, as follows:
Where a third person is liable to the employee or the dependents for the injury or
death, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employee or the depen-
dents against such third person ....
Section 319 of the Workmen's Compensation Law as reenacted June 21, 1939, P.L. 520. The
1945 amendment caused the statute to read, as it does currently, in relevant portion, as
follows:
Where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the act or omission of
a third party, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employee ...
against such third party ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 671 (Purdon 1975) (emphasis added) (Section 319 of the Workmen's
Compensation Law as amended May 18, 1945, P.L. 671).
This change lessens the burden upon the employer; whereas before 1945 the employer
arguably had to prove negligence on the part of the third party, after the amendment subro-
gation could be obtained under a "but for" the act-of-the-third party standard.
The logic in Travelers Insurance is thus especially infirm. In the latter case, an insurer
was denied subrogation after an employee, who had received workmen's compensation pay-
ments, won a consent judgment in another state against a third party. The court ruled that
consent judgments were contractual in nature and thus did not establish negligence on the
third party payee's part. Citing Broderick, the court refused to allow subrogation in spite of
the employee's recovery.
The infirmity of the Travelers opinion, however, stems not only from its reliance upon a
case gutted of significance. If Travelers Insurance is ever to be considered correct, it is
doubtful that subrogation could be achieved against any settlement arrived at between the
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demonstrated without an action having been brought by the em-
ployee himself.
The Richmond Machine court, in reaffirming the prohibition
against the independent cause of action, buttressed its holding by
pointing to Justice Larsen's insistence in Tsarnas that the right to
subrogation was "not automatic" but, rather, required a judicial
proceeding in order for the employer to establish its freedom from
fault. 10 2 Because the language was offered in support of the asser-
tion that the subrogation right had to be "worked out" through the
employer, however, this portion of the court's opinion cannot be
construed as central to the decision.
10 3
Any suggestion, therefore, that the court cited Justice Larsen's
concurrence for the proposition that the employer's negligence
must be determined in a later proceeding seems wholly unwar-
ranted. This conclusion is supported by the language of the court's
holding, which states:
We therefore hold that section 319 is an exclusive remedy, and that for an
employer or its insurer to enforce its subrogation rights, it must proceed in
an action brought on behalf of the injured employee in order to determine
the liability of the third party to the employee. If such liability is deter-
mined, then the employer or its insurer may recover, out of an award to
the injured employee, the amount it has paid in worker's compensation
benefits.1 0 4 (emphasis added)
In addition, the Richmond Machine court also claimed that to so
employee and the third party (where the employer was not an active participant), since such
settlements will rarely contain admissions of negligence on the third party's part. Since it
has long been held that settlements with an employee cannot deprive an insurance carrier of
subrogation rights, see Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 288 Pa. 85, 135 A. 858 (1927), the sugges-
tion in Travelers Insurance, (implicitly approved in Richmond Machine), that the work-
men's compensation carrier must prove a case in negligence is doubly erroneous.
See also Associated Hospital Service of Philadelphia v. Pustilnik, 262 Pa. Super. 600, 606
n.1, 396 A.2d 1332, 1335 n.1 (1979), vacated, 497 Pa. 221, 489 A.2d 1149 (1981). Citing older
cases, Judge Spaeth rejected the argument that a case in negligence need be proven in order
for subrogation to be achieved:
This argument is inconsistent with long-standing authority that a subrogee is not
required to prove a third party's negligence in a suit to enforce its subrogation rights
against the subrogor, when the subrogor brought and settled a previous action against
the third party without obtaining a verdict.
Id. (non-workmen's compensation situation).
102. See 488 Pa. at 524, 412 A.2d at 1099 (Larsen, J., concurring).
103. Justice Larsen offered his Tsarnas comments solely to voice his displeasure with
the prospect of a negligent employer being fully subrogated to its employee's recovery. Since
the issue in Richmond Machine concerned the means by which subrogation is achieved, and
not the equities attached thereto, the court's use-or misuse-of Justice Larsen's concur-
rence must be considered dictum.
104. 455 A.2d at 690.
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hold was consistent with its holdings in Heckendorn and Kelly
which prohibited joinder of the employer, 10 and thus, arguably,
any consideration of employer negligence. The court's use of Jus-
tice Larsen's Tsarnas concurrence, however, again demonstrated
that the issue of the employer's subrogation had not been
resolved. 0 6
As indicated before, the matter has been put to rest by the su-
preme court. In its consideration of Heckendorn,0 7 the court af-
firmed the superior court's ruling that no joinder of the employer
could be had in order to apportion fault under the Comparative
Negligence Act, but, unlike the lower court, also addressed directly
the issue of the employer's subrogation.108
In affirming the superior court, Chief Justice Roberts engaged in
the same principled reading of the comparative negligence statute
which had been undertaken by the lower courts. 0 9 Justice Roberts
pointedly emphasized that the statute plainly allowed liability to
be apportioned only among "defendants against whom recovery is
allowed."110 Proceeding on to examine the exclusivity feature of
section 303, Justice Roberts claimed that the latter provision could
"be read in full and complete harmony" with the comparative neg-
ligence statute,"' since section 303(b) disallows any employer lia-
bility and the comparative negligence statute, in turn, prohibits
apportionment of negligence with respect to the liability-free
employer."'
Nor did Justice Roberts think that the employer could be joined
merely for purposes of apportioning fault. Adopting the reasoning
105. Id.
106. For additional evidence of uncertainty with regard to what rights the employer
had to subrogation, see Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1982). In
Hamme the court, citing Heckendorn, affirmed a district court ruling forbidding joinder of
the employer in order to adjudicate its comparative fault. Id. See 512 F. Supp. 944 (M.D.
Pa. 1981). Judge Rosenn, in an extended dissent, claimed that "the [comparative negli-
gence] statute does not alter the equitable considerations that affect the liability of third
parties to injured employees," and insisted that the employer could be joined under Penn-
sylvania procedural rules in order for comparative fault to be determined. 716 F.2d at 165
(Rosenn, J., dissenting). Citing the landmark cases of the old "Pennsylvania Rule," Judge
Rosenn also maintained that the "extent of the employer's recovery turns ... on both the
plaintiff's ability to establish the liability of the third party and the employer's freedom
from negligence." Id. at 164-65 & n.22.
107. 465 A.2d 609 (1983).
108. Id. at 613.
109. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
110. 465 A.2d at 612 (emphasis omitted).
111. Id. (citing Heckendorn, 293 Pa. Super. at 480-81, 439 A.2d at 677).
112. 465 A.2d at 612 (citing 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 7102 (Purdon 1983)).
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of the superior court, he ruled that such joining, either as an addi-
tional defendant 1 or as an involuntary plaintiff,"4 would be im-
proper under procedural rules.
Turning to the subrogation issue, Justice Roberts squarely de-
nied that the employer's statutory right under section 319 could be
challenged by an allegation that the employer was in any way re-
sponsible for the employee's injury.'1 6 Maintaining that recoveries
made by employees were subject to the employer's right to reim-
bursement for compensation payments made, Justice Roberts
made it clear that the possibility of employer negligence was not to
be considered, stating that "[t]he issue of the employer's negli-
gence is as irrelevant at the subrogation stage of the proceedings as
it is at trial, and as it is in every case of employee injury in which
no third party tortfeasor is involved."""
Justice Roberts also specifically repudiated Stark v. Posh Con-
struction Co.,1 7 a principle case exponent of the old "Pennsylvania
Rule","5 stating that the "dictum" therein to the effect that em-
ployer negligence would forbid subrogation was not persuasive, ob-
serving that:
Stark was decided when joinder of the employer at trial was still permitted,
long before the legislature's decision in 1974 to triple the amount of work-
ers' compensation payable to injured employees and at the same time to
foreclose, through the enactment of section 303(b), the adjudication of em-
ployer negligence in all cases of employee injury.
1 19
Justice Larsen joined in the court's opinion, but was totally at
113. Id. at n.2. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
114. 465 A.2d at 612 n.2. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. This ruling can-
not be considered merely formalistic; as the Kelly court pointed out, Pa. R.C.P. No. 2227
(forbidding joinder unless a "joint interest" exists and substantive law so permits) is "not
predicated upon some administrative benefit to be gained by joinder but upon the unity and
identity of the interest of the co-owners who are to be joined." 307 Pa. Super. at 368-69, 453
A.2d at 628 (quoting 7 GOODSICH-AMRAM 2d § 2227(a):1). But see Hamme v. Dreis & Krump
Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d 152, 165-66 & n.24 (3d Cir. 1982) (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn
argued that the employer should be treated as a party whose joinder may be had under the
Pennsylvania rules. Id. His assertion is, apparently, premised on the belief that the em-
ployer does in fact have a joint interest with the employee: "In fact, the employer is actually
bringing the lawsuit every time that the employee sues a third party. The employer is al-
ways present with its hand out to take its share of the money recovered by the employee
against the third party." Id. (quoting Leford v. Central Medical Pavilion, Inc., 90 F.R.D.
445, 447 (W.D. Pa. 1981)).
115. 465 A.2d at 613.
116. Id.
117. 192 Pa. Super. 409, 162 A.2d 9 (1960).
118. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
119. 465 A.2d at 613 n.3.
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odds with Justice Robert's ruling with respect to subrogation. Cit-
ing his own concurrence in Tsarnas,20 Justice Larsen maintained
that "the employer's right to subrogation is not automatic and
some judicial proceeding must be had in order for the employer's
lack or degree of fault to be established.""12
Because Justice Larsen's brief comments are diametrically in op-
position to a principle holding of the majority, it is difficult and
indeed improper to consider such comments as constituting a
"concurrence": a more accurate characterization would be "concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part." While at first blush this dis-
tinction may seem petty, the point sought to be made is that Jus-
tice Larsen's affirmative demand for a separate judicial proceeding
whereat, one imagines, the employer and employee engage in negli-
gence litigation, is not part of the law. In Heckendorn Pennsylva-
nia has conclusively aligned itself with the "majority rule," and the
employer is subrogated under section 319 regardless of allegations
of negligence.
III. CRITICISMS AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA
RULE
Because Pennsylvania has joined the traditional majority posi-
tion with respect to joinder of the employer and the latter's subro-
gation rights, 2 the coextensive, traditional criticisms of the policy
are now applicable in Pennsylvania. With Maio v. Fahs1 2 and
Brown v. Dickey"" now clearly deprived of any practical signifi-
cance, Professor Larson can no longer praise Pennsylvania as pos-
sessing "the fairest available compromise in the light of all the
conflicting policy interests."12 5
However, it is unclear whether Pennsylvania's alignment with
the majority position creates as inequitable a situation as is so
often alleged.12 6 Having withstood attacks brought under general
120. 488 Pa. at 524, 412 A.2d at 1099 (Larsen, J., concurring).
121. 465 A.2d at 613.
122. See supra note 10.
123. 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
124. 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959).
125. Larson, supra note 10, at 360 n.22, 363.
126. See Hamme, 716 F.2d at 167 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn, quoting Pul-
liam, Comparative Loss Allocation, 31 FnD'N INS. CONS. 80, 87 (1980), maintained that to
make the third party bear the full cost of successful employee suits is "illogical, doctrinally
unsound, and aesthetically unpleasant and would be inconsequential if the result were eco-
nomically efficient, particularly humane, or an effective deterrent to tortious conduct. The
result produced by current law is none of these things." Id.
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notions of equity, under constitutional pretexts, and finally under
the Comparative Negligence Act, the inference that the Pennsylva-
nia judiciary's construction of sections 303 and 319 has merit is
compelling. Whether the courts' construction of the sections in fact
creates such an inequitable situation as to render it "too great a
victory for the employer," however, requires an examination of the
arguments brought by the Heckendorn policy's critics.
A. The Liability-Free Employer and the Third Party
The policy conclusively established in Heckendorn-that the
employer shall be free from liability and joinder, and shall enjoy
full subrogation-has been the target of attack on a number of
specific equitable grounds. The argument against the first element
of the Heckendorn policy, alluded to earlier,12 7 is that it is inher-
ently unfair to make a third party defendant totally liable to an
injured plaintiff-employee where there is the possibility of concur-
rent negligence on the part of the employer. This argument, ad-
vanced in Arnold v. Borbonus in equitable terms'28 and in Tsarnas
v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation in equal protection lan-
guage,129 clearly has some initial appeal, but upon closer considera-
tion imposition of such liability on the third party cannot be con-
sidered prohibitively inequitable.
Although there may be some question with respect to whether
the legislature fully considered the issue of subrogation when it en-
acted the amendment to section 303, it was quite clear that the
legislature intended that the employer was to be free from any lia-
bility beyond workmen's compensation. As the Hefferin court
pointed out, the Pennsylvania legislature had undertaken a major
overhaul of the workmen's compensation act pursuant to recom-
mendations made by a federal commission, two of which empha-
sized the importance of employer immunity and the exclusiveness
of the employer's liability. 30 The Hefferin court thus came to the
conclusion that the amendment to section 303 could be attributed
to the general overhauling of the Act. However, the court only
hinted that the motive for prohibiting the employer's liability to
127. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
128. See 257 Pa. Super. at 120, 390 A.2d at 276 (Spaeth, J., dissenting) (questioning
"the propriety of assessing the full cost. . . against the third party, who is forced to pay for
the negligence of another."). See also infra notes 153-76 and accompanying text (discussing
inequity of allowing unrestricted subrogation).
129. See 262 Pa. Super. at 437-43, 396 A.2d at 1249-54.
130. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the third party was the great increase in compensation rates that
had accompanied the overhaul, and which was enacted in response
to federal pressure. 31 Frankly put, the decision to make the third
party bear by itself the financial brunt of employee suits may be
said to reflect a determination that the employer had to be given
something in return for the increase in mandatory workmen's com-
pensation liability which had been imposed upon it.1
2
Whether this economic play-off works a prohibitive inequity
against the third party has been addressed in various ways by the
courts. The court in Kelly v. Carborundum Co. 533 dismissed this
equitable attack by claiming that "[tihe law does not now and
never has required that all possible tortfeasors be made parties to
an action." 3 4 In a concurring opinion in the same case, Judge
Montemuro explained this assertion:
The common law has always permitted a plaintiff to recover his entire claim
in damages from any tortfeasor he could reach, leaving that party to re-
cover, if possible, from his fellow defendants. If the joint tortfeasors were
judgment-proof, that was not considered to be the plaintiff's problem. If the
"legislatively created bar to contribution" is viewed as analogous to the
long-tolerated situation in which one tortfeasor is unfairly "stuck" with an
entire recovery, the conscience of the court cannot be shocked by the
result.135
To a certain extent the above response is formalistic; but seeks
to quash the allegation of unfairness on purely historical rather
than upon legitimate policy grounds.'3 6 In order to adequately jus-
tify the third party bearing the entire burden of the employee's
131. See 247 Pa. Super. at 368, 372 A.2d at 870.
132. This has been implicitly acknowledged by several courts. See Heckendorn, 465
A.2d at 613 n.3; Tsarnas, 488 Pa. at 523, 412 A.2d at 1099; He/ferin, 247 Pa. Super. at 368,
372 A.2d at 870-71. For the benefit level provisions before and after the 1974 amendment,
see 1974 Pa. Laws Act No. 263, at 791-96 (amending Section 306 of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act). The current schedule of compensation is found in 77 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §
582 (Purdon 1983). See also infra note 136.
133. 307 Pa. Super. 361, 453 A.2d 624 (1982).
134. Id. at 367, 453 A.2d at 627-28.
135. Id. at 373, 453 A.2d at 630-31.
136. But see Brozzetti v. Hempt Bros., 456 A.2d 595, 597 (1983). In Brozzetti Judge
Brosky used this same argument, but linked it directly to the policy underlying workmen's
compensation:
In reaching our conclusion in Kelly ... we rejected the argument, also made in this
case, that injustice will result if only the third party remains a defendant, since he
may have to pay more than his proportionate share of the loss[:] "This argument is
not persuasive. The law does not now and never has required that all tortfeasors be
made parties to an action." If an employer accepts the responsibility of paying
workmen's compensation benefits, his negligence is no longer a factor.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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action, one must return to the legislature's concern for the gross
liability of the employer in the workmen's compensation scheme.
By relieving the employer of liability to third parties sued by em-
ployees, the legislature has mitigated the increased burden placed
upon employers by the considerable increases in compensation
rates enacted. This mitigation is not illusory. In the words of one
court, "elimination of third party actions against employers per-
mits employers to better estimate compensation costs [and] . . .
prevents the uncertain drain on the benefit fund cause by the em-
ployer contribution costs and legal defense expenses that had re-
sulted from third party actions in the past."'
13 7
Disallowing employer liability in third party actions, then, con-
stitutes a loss-spreading move calculated to enhance the economic
viability of employers who have already been encumbered with
substantial compensation liability. The value at stake, clearly, is a
healthy benefit system providing meaningful compensation
rates.13 8 In bearing the financial brunt of employee suits, the third
137. Adamik v. Pullman Standard, 439 F. Supp. at 786. See also Jones v. Carborun-
dum Co., 515 F. Supp. 559, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
One commentator has suggested other mitigation in the compensation burden worked by
the Heckendorn decision, pointing out that since the increase in benefit levels was approved
by the legislature in 1973, the number of claims filed in Pennsylvania has tripled, rising
from 42,567 in 1972 to 127,658 in 1982. When coupled with the tripling of the maximum
payment involved-$94 per week in 1972 to $284 in 1982-the conclusion is compelled that
the elimination of third-party actions against the employer brings to the latter greater relief
than simply enhancing ease in estimating costs. See A. BARBIERI, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AND OccUPATIONAL Diss As 62 (1983 Supp.). Judge Barbieri also alludes to the perception on
the part of business commentators that the increased burden of compensation benefits con-
stitutes "a major cost factor affecting the competitive ability of Pennsylvania to remain a
major industrial state." Id. When viewed in light of this anxiety, the decision to free the
employer from at least some potential liability seems even more judicious.
At least one other state legislature has acted specifically to prevent an excessively liberal
workmen's compensation system from creating an atmosphere prohibitive of business devel-
opment. After the Arizona Supreme Court had effectively abolished the statute of limita-
tions for filing compensation claims and appeals, see Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz.
130, 493 P.2d 913 (1972), the legislature moved directly to forbid consideration by the courts
of any untimely filed action. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-947, 23-1061(A) (1983). The
proffered reasoning: "an effort to obtain some cost containment measure to allow employers
to continue to operate in Arizona and attract new employers to locate [there]." Hearing on
S.B. 1001 Before the Committee on Commerce and Labor, Ariz. State Sen. (February 7,
1980) (remarks of Mr. Michael Green). See Note, 22 DUQ. L. REv. 809, 816-22 (1983) (dis-
cussing West Virginia's abolition of strict time limitations).
138. As discussed before, the Hefferin court, among others, ascribed the legislature's
amendment of section 303 to recommendations of a National Commission convened specifi-
cally to address the efficacy of state workmen's compensation systems. A principle objective
of the Commission was to encourage the states to raise compensation rates, having found
that those currently being paid were inadequate. See REPORT, supra note 16, at 53-75.
Although Judge Spaeth questioned whether section 303(b) could be attributed to the rec-
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party is merely accepting a portion of the responsibility for the
achievement of this goal, and its inability to seek contribution
from the employer cannot be considered inherently inequitable.
While the added burden placed upon the third party is thus jus-
tifiable in terms of economic policy, the perceived inequity is also
mitigated by other factors. The third party defendant is still at
liberty to prove that the employer was negligent and thus escape
or reduce its own liability. The third party defendant does lose
"the procedural advantage of discovery against the employer as a
party litigant," ' 9 but this by no means forecloses consideration by
the jury of aspects of alleged employer acts or omissions.
In addition, the statute itself specifically allows contribution or
indemnification to the third party who has contracted therefor
before the occurrence which gives rise to the action. Obviously this
provision does not extend protection to the third party who is a
total stranger to the employee-employer relationship, but as noted
above, in such instances the question of negligence on the em-
ployer's part is often not at issue. 40 In the industrial accident, on
the other hand, the third party defendant is often a seller of ma-
chinery or a subcontractor who has the opportunity, before the ac-
cident or injury takes place, to contractually provide for contribu-
tion or indemnity from the employer.
14'
Numerous commentators have pointed out that the advent of
strict liability concepts places a great burden on the equipment
manufacturer and seller who is prevented, in light of section
ommendations dealing with employer immunity and exclusivity of liability, see supra note
16 and accompanying text, there can be no doubt that both changes--preclusion of liability
and the tripling of compensation rates--find their moving source in this federal pressure.
Shortly before the release of the Commission's report, predictions that the federal govern-
ment would move to preempt state workmen's compensation programs were ripe. See, e.g.,
Mittleman, Workmen's Compensation Reform: The Prospects for Federal Action, in 1970
PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 123. Mittleman discusses the various legislation offered in Congress during
this period which was aimed at remedying the perceived failure of state programs. Id. at
125-28. Of significance in his observation is that one of the key proposals in this area,
presented by Representative Carl D. Perkins, would require all states to meet the standards
of the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. It is not surprising,
then, that the Pennsylvania legislature chose, in amending section 303, to adopt the policy
of the LHWCA, with its prohibition against joinder and allowance of full subrogation. Heck-
endorn thus seems justified in terms of probable legislative intent.
139. Jones v. Carborundum Co., 515 F. Supp. at 562.
140. See also infra note 160 and accompanying text.
141. See O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claims: An Answer




303(b), from mitigating his damages, which are often considerable
in product liability actions.14 The provision in section 303(b) per-
mitting contractual indemnification provides the mechanism by
which this burden can be alleviated. The ability of an equipment
manufacturer, supplier, or subcontractor to obtain such a clause in
its contract with the employer turns,. admittedly, on the bargaining
power which it possesses. 14 8 It has been noted, however, that this
may be only an illusory problem.
14 4
B. Joinder for Purposes of Apportioning Fault and the Policy of
Section 303(b)
It was established in Tsarnas v. Jones and Laughlin that section
303(b) worked to prevent contribution from the employer. Not un-
til Heckendorn, however, was it conclusively established that the
section worked also to prohibit joinder merely for the purpose of
apportioning fault and thus, conceivably, reducing the defendant's
liability.
The most impelling justification for prohibiting such limited
joinder finds its basis in the same economic trade-off discussed
above; the burden of vastly increased compensation payments
should relieve the employer from the cost of litigating actions, even
if the employer is not ultimately liable for its share of apportioned
fault.
There is, however, no basis in the first place for believing that
the legislature, in overhauling the Workmen's Compensation Act,
sought to disturb the independent relationship between the plain-
tiff-employee and the third party. This would be the effect of al-
lowing joinder of the employer for purposes of apportioning fault,
142. See Mitchell, supra note 5; Seidelson, The 402A Defendant and the Negligent
Actor, 15 DuQ. L. RPv. 371 (1977).
143. See O'Connell, supra note 141, at 440. Professor O'Connell, however, does not
therefore advocate employer liability over to the third party. Characterizing what has be-
come the current policy situation in Pennsylvania after Heckendorn as a "mess", id. at 441,
Professor O'Connell has a different proposal:
Employers should contract with their employees, pursuant to collective bargaining, to
have employees waive their common law rights, not only against their employer...
but against any suppliers to the employer whom the employer and the union desig-
nate. Why would unions representing employees agree to that? Because the money
manufacturers currently pay for products liability insurance, covering them for the
machinery they sell to employers, overwhelmingly goes to lawyers and insurance over-
head. These sums can more efficiently be made available to compensate employees in
other ways.
Id. at 441-42.
144. See infra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
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since the employee's verdict would, conceivably, be reduced pro
rata in the amount of the employer's negligence. While section 303
does not on its face forbid joinder for purposes of apportioning
fault, to so allow would thus effect an unintended intrusion upon
the rights of the employee as an injured plaintiff to recover for the
full amount of his injury.
The Kelly and Heckendorn courts' refusal to allow joinder under
the rules of procedure, on the grounds that there was no "unity of
interest" between the employer and the employee, 45 may thus be
considered less an exercise in formalism that it perhaps appeared.
Compulsory joinder, designed to ensure that all indispensable par-
ties are present so that actions can proceed, was properly denied in
these instances where the plaintiff's action is totally independent
and where the party sought to be joined would actually cause in-
jury to the plaintiff's cause. 4 6
Still, the enactment of the Comparative Negligence Act added
fury to the argument that the employer should be joined solely for
the purpose of apportioning fault. As has been discussed,' 47 no
such argument ever survived an appellate court review-a result
which appears proper.
As the Heckendorn court noted, the comparative negligence
statute specifically guarantees a full recovery for the plaintiff
"from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from
recovery." Joining the employer, as discussed above, would operate
only to decrease the plaintiff's recovery, a result intended by
neither section 303(b) nor the comparative negligence statute. In
response it has been argued that it "exalts form over substance to
pretend that the employer is not a party from whom recovery is
145. See Kelly, 453 A.2d at 628-29; Heckendorn, 465 A.2d at 612 n.2.
146. Several courts have claimed that to allow joinder of the employer merely for the
purposes of apportioning fault would have another detrimental effect on the employee-
plaintiff:
There is no justification, practically, for the employer vigorously to defend itself when
there is no possibility that damages can be awarded. The joinder of the employer
with no exposure to liability could very well result in an acquiesence by the joined
employer in the allocation of liability proposed by other defendants. This could only
result in a reduction of plaintiff's award of damages, possibly unrelated to the true
proportion of liability.
Lawless v. Central Engineering Co., 502 F. Supp. at 311.
This scenario would only transpire, however, if the employer had absolutely no subroga-
tion rights. If the employer had the opportunity to gain subrogation to recovery and was
also a joined party. it would have every conceivable interest in demonstrating that the third
party was the negligent actor. Because Pennsylvania has always had a subrogation statute,
the court's worry seems unmerited.
147. See supra notes 68 - 120 and accompanying text.
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allowed, "148 since the employer's subrogation right was believed by
some, before Heckendorn, to be contingent upon a showing that
the employer was free from negligence. 149 Were such the case, as
under the old Pennsylvania rule, the third party's liability would
be reduced in the amount of the employer's workmen's compensa-
tion liability. With the right to subrogation now firmly established,
however, the "form over substance" argument has no compelling
force, since the employer can no longer in any sense be considered
a party against whom recovery is allowed.
What becomes evident, in fact, after examining the arguments of
those advocating joinder merely for the purpose of apportioning
fault, is that there was a great reluctance to believe that the
amendment to section 303 worked any change in the Pennsylvania
scheme at all. Whether advancing the argument before or after the
introduction of comparative negligence, the net result sought was
precisely the same as that produced by the "Pennsylvania Rule.' 5 0
Such advocates must necessarily agree with the early trial court
decisions holding that section 303(b) merely enacted existing
law.18 '
With overwhelming evidence available that the legislature was
acting to modify the Workmen's Compensation Act,1 5 2 however,
the above conclusion is untenable. Much more impelling is the con-
clusion that the court in Heckendorn has vindicated the legislative
motive behind section 303(b), and has come to the only logical con-
clusion possible. If, under the old Pennsylvania Rule, the employer
was never liable for more than its workmen's compensation liabil-
ity, then the legislature's new mandate that the employer "shall
not be liable" would be meaningless if not construed to mean that
the only liability the employer ever possessed was now to be elimi-
nated. In repudiating Stark v. Posh and holding that the em-
ployer's negligence is irrelevant at the stage of the proceedings
whereat those workmen's compensation payments are retrieved,
the court has achieved this proper construction.
With this observation, arguments for joinder posed pursuant to
the enactment of the comparative negligence statute seem particu-
148. Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d at 165 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
149. See, e.g., id. at 164 n.22.
150. See supra notes 3-5.
151. See, e.g., George v. Chestnut Ridge R.R. Co., 1 D. & C.3d 154 (1976) (holding that
amendment to section 303 "applies to limit joinder only where injury is caused solely by a
third party."). See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 13, note 138 and accompanying text.
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larly meritless. If the principle motive for allowing joinder under
the old rule was to ensure that the employer not achieve an inequi-
table subrogation, to suddenly argue for joinder under comparative
negligence on the grounds that the third party is bearing too great
a burden of liability, is to allege legislative motives of more gener-
ous liability-sharing than the courts were ever willing to acknowl-
edge, at the very time that the legislature had expressly limited
employer liability.
C. Subrogation and Employer Fault
As reflected in Tsarnas and in the Heckendorn superior court
opinion, " the prohibition of joinder of the employer was much
easier to rule upon than was the issue of the extent of employer
subrogation. It is, after all, not difficult to accept that the legisla-
ture has chosen to burden one party more than another in the
course of making a policy decision. It was more difficult to rule, as
was finally done by the supreme court in Heckendorn, that the em-
ployer was to be subrogated regardless of the possibility that negli-
gence may have been present on the part of the employer.
As discussed above, the supreme court, in guaranteeing subroga-
tion, came to the only logical interpretive conclusion; if the em-
ployer was to be free of liability in the context of an employee's
third party action, this necessarily had to mean that the em-
ployer's claim for workmen's compensation reimbursement be pre-
served."" The Heckendorn decision with respect to subrogation is
thus correct from an interpretive standpoint.
It is, however, this element of the policy arrangement achieved
by sections 303, 319 and Heckendorn, which is most susceptible to
attack as being inequitable. Most frequently heard is the allegation
that allowing the employer to recoup his workmen's compensation
payments results in an unjust enrichment 55 or that the employer
is being rewarded for his own wrongdoing. 15 6 Allowing "automatic"
subrogation is also subject to the criticism that it will discourage
employer efforts toward achieving safety in the workplace by re-
moving economic incentive; if the employer knows that he will be
153. See Tsarnas, 488 Pa. at 520 n.2, 412 A.2d at 1097 n.2; Heckendorn, 293 Pa.
Super. at 482, 439 A.2d at 678.
154. See supra text accompanying note 151.
155. See, e.g., Arnold v. Borbonus, 257 Pa. Super. at 118-19, 390 A.2d at 274-75
(Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting).




reimbursed for his accident costs, the argument alleges, there will
be no interest in trying to avoid them. 5 7 There is, then, both an
equitable and an economic argument against permitting un-
restricted subrogation. Before considering whether the arguments
are of merit, however, it is important to acknowledge the role
which subrogation is meant to play in the workmen's compensation
scheme.
As originally conceived, holding the employer liable for employee
injuries regardless of fault was meant to make compensation for
work-related accidents a "cost of production. ' 15 8 Without repeat-
ing the full history of how this social policy came about,1 59 one may
generalize that workmen's compensation assumes an employment
environment where, to a certain extent, accidents are inevitable.
This assumption having been made, it becomes sensible to spread
the cost of accidents across the public by way of increased prices
representing the cost of insurance premiums.
It is not difficult to perceive that if a party foreign to the em-
ployment environment intrudes upon the work relationship and
causes injury to the employee, this injury's compensation will not
fall within the cost-of-production model. This is so because the
employee's injury will automatically generate workmen's compen-
sation payments, creating a new cost of production which may
have no source in the employment relationship. Because the em-
ployee is free, however, to sue this intruder, to allow the employer
to recoup his workmen's compensation payments by way of subro-
gation to any recovery the employee achieves will restore integrity
to the cost-of-production model.160 At the same time, of course, the
157. See infra notes 177-182 and accompanying text.
158. See Rudy v. McCloskey & Co., 152 Pa. Super. 101, 107, 30 A.2d 805, 808 (1943)
(purpose of workmen's Compensation Act "to relieve to some extent the employee ...
from the economic consequences of his injury and make them part of the cost of operation
of business, to be paid ultimately by the consuming public ...."). See also REPORT, supra
note 16, at 34 (workmen's compensation acts allocated costs of injuries to employer because
of "inherent hazards of industrial employment. Compensation for work-related accidents
was therefore accepted as a cost of production.").
159. For a thorough discussion regarding the historical origins of workmen's compen-
sation, see Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982); Mitchell, supra note 5, at 349-454; Comment,
The Workmen's Compensation Insurer's Immunity, 74 DICK. L. REv. 135, 136-38 (1969).
160. In many cases, however, it is difficult to consider the third party an "intruder".
The third party, for example, who is the manufacturer and/or supplier of industrial equip-
ment is very much an actor in the industrial process. Allowing an employer to be subrogated
to a recovery made against such a third party, when the employer has indeed been negli-
gent, does not immediately seem to be justified as fulfilling the cost-of-production paradigm.
But see infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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employer's subrogation to the extent of his payments prevents the
employee from achieving a double recovery-once from the strictly
liable employer in the form of workmen's compensation and again
from the third party in the form of a civil verdict.
The argument that it is unfair for the employer to recoup bene-
fits inevitably originates, however, in situations where the third
party is not a bona fide intruder, that is, in circumstances where
there has been opportunity for the employer to have acted negli-
gently itself. In such instances disallowing subrogation does not
seem to violate the cost-of-production model; the model incurs ob-
vious violation only when a total stranger is the intruder upon the
relationship.""' While few critics would maintain that subrogation
should be denied in the latter situation, 6 2 there are other counter-
vailing values besides the integrity of the cost-of-production model
and the prevention of employee double recovery, which militate to-
ward allowing the employer to be subrogated to employee recov-
eries automatically.
As a preliminary comment, it must be questioned whether the
instinctively appealing equitable notions of unjust enrichment or
reward can be applied to this policy decision concerning the loss-
allocation to be maintained in the context of industrial and work-
place accidents. As one court has pointed out, a notion such as "re-
warding the wrongdoer" via subrogation "is out of place in the in-
dustrial scene where human negligence by corporate agents and
employees is commonplace and . . . carries no moral connota-
tions."' 63 This claim finds support in the fact that the causes of
industrial accidents have been shown to be especially complex,'"
and determination of fault as between employer, employee and
161. Cf. Comment, Indemnity Clauses and Workers' Compensation: A Proposal for
Preserving the Employer's Limited Liability, 70 CALIF. L. Rv. 1421 (1982). The writer, in
arguing for limited liability of certain third parties sued by injured employees, premises his
argument on the view that the employee has "accepted the quid pro quo of guaranteed
recovery through the workers' compensation system .... " Id. at 1439. This limitation,
however, is advocated only to the extent of injuries suffered which are closely related to the
actual job performance. The writer thus concludes: "there is no reason to believe that an
employee ever intended to agree to a limited recovery when, for example, he is injured on
the jobsite by a negligent automobile driver not involved with the job." Id. (citation
omitted).
162. But see Epstein, supra note 51, at 466, 469-70 (advocating abolition of all em-
ployer subrogation liens); Comment, supra note 161, at 1440-45. Neither of the preceding
commentators, however, propose abolition of the employer's subrogation lien without other
modifications to the third-party recovery scheme.
163. Schweizer, 70 N.J. at 287, 359 A.2d at 861.
164. See REPORT, supra note 16, at 119-20. See generally Petersen, SAFETY MANAGE-
mEsir: A HUMAN APPROACH 17-25 (1975).
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third parties is difficult;16 to quickly condemn unrestricted subro-
gation in hyperbolic equitable terms thus does not seem merited.
There is also question as to whether in the typical industrial ac-
cident there is much "unjust enrichment" going on in the first
place, even if there has been some negligence on the employer's
part. Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has made the following
observation:
[When the manufacturer cannot obtain an indemnification contract from
the employer-vendee] the manufacturer will attempt, most often success-
fully, to load the cost of his product liability insurance onto the price the
employer must pay for the machinery. As a result, the essential bargain
mandated by worker's compensation has arguably been broken; originally,
in other words, the employer was compelled to pay for all employee injuries
on a no-fault basis up to limited amounts .... But now, in addition to
paying worker's compensation benefits, the employer increasingly pays the
equivalent of common law liability reflected in increased costs of machinery
or indemnity agreements with his capital goods suppliers. 66
Professor O'Connell continues on to point out that while subro-
gation statutes might work to help the employer retrieve some of
this added liability, the employer is still at a disadvantage:
[As] legal and insurance scholars have been pointing out for years, these so-
called subrogation claims, whereby insured losses are shifted and reshifted
in multiple insurance arrangements, always shortchange insureds in the
end, since multiple and expensive layers of insurance are thereby required
of everyone.'
67
The employer is thus by way of subrogation recouping no more
than the increased costs which it has paid in other forms by virtue
of third party suits-the institution of which has greatly in-
creased-brought by injured employees. The employer is entitled
to this recoupment, further, whether partially negligent or not,
under Professor O'Connell's analysis. This can be safely said, for
the loading of the cost of product liability insurance onto the price
of machinery is undertaken in acknowledgement that in general
the employer cannot be made jointly liable. Because the predomi-
nating case situations arising under sections 303(a) and 319 are ex-
165. Cf. Petersen, supra note 164, at 17-18. The author, in advocating a new approach
to achieving optimal industrial safety, rejects a method of accident analysis traditionally
referred to as the "Domino Theory" as too narrow; the author alleges that "behind every
accident there lie many contributing factors, causes, and subcauses. The theory of multiple
causation is that these factors combine together in random fashion causing accidents." Id. at
17.
166. O'Connell, supra note 141, at 440-41.
167. Id. at 441.
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actly as discussed by Professor O'Connell,"" to disallow subroga-
tion to any employer, negligent or not, would apparently work to
make it pay twice. If one accepts Professor O'Connell's assertions,
the result in Heckendorn-that the issue of the employer's negli-
gence is "irrelevant" at the subrogation stage of the proceed-
ings-is correct and cannot be characterized as inequitable.169
Professor O'Connell's theory effectively puts the equities on the
other side of the table. If it is found, however, that the assertions
made therein are absolutely unsupported by future Pennsylvania
economic realities, there are still other issues which must be faced
by those arguing that subrogation by the concurrently negligent
employer be forbidden.
Justice Larsen's concurrences in Tsarnas and Heckendorn call
such issues to attention. Because apparently willing to accept that
the legislature could legitimately make the policy decision to ex-
empt the employer from liability and make third parties bear the
brunt of employee actions,70 Justice Larsen found section 303(b)
both constitutional and operative to prevent joinder for purposes
of apportioning fault. As discussed, however, he demanded, and
continues to demand, that a separate proceeding be carried out "in
order for the employer's lack or degree of fault to be
established.
'17 1
This demand, of course, directly conflicts with Justice Roberts'
holding that "the issue of the employer's negligence is as irrelevant
at the subrogation stage of the proceedings as it is at trial ... 72
Justice Roberts' statement is logically interpreted to mean that af-
ter the successful employee verdict or settlement, the employer ap-
pears before the workmen's compensation referee-who, as always,
has no interest in negligence on the part of either party-and
presents evidence of its workmen's compensation payments and of
168. See, e.g., Lackie v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 559 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (shear press manufacturer sued by injured employee under strict liability theory);
Jones v. Carborundum Co., 515 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (grinding wheel manufacturer
sued by injured employee under strict liability theory); Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co.,
512 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. PA. 1981), affd, 716 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1982) (steel power press
manufacturer sued under strict liability theory).
169. Similarly, if one accepts Professor O'Connell's theory, the "cost-of-production"
model may be of limited analytic utility.
170. See Tsarnas, 488 Pa. at 524, 412 A.2d at 1099 (Larsen, J., concurring) (stating
that the "[m]ajority's limitation [bar of a third party's joinder of the employer] is within the
scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act . . ").
171. See Kelly v. Carborundum Co., - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 969 (1984) (Larsen, J.,
concurring).
172. 465 A.2d at 613.
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the employee recovery. Justice Larsen, on the other hand, is effec-
tively arguing for a new civil proceeding at which, one imagines,
the issue of employer negligence is very relevant. 
17
If one- takes the latter suggestion seriously, several questions
with regard to the parameters of the proceeding are raised.
Presuming first that some employer negligence has been estab-
lished at the trial between the employee and the third party, it is
questionable whether the employee could take advantage of such
finding, any attempt to collaterally estop the employer from deny-
ing negligence probably being frowned upon. The perplexing ques-
tion of whether the employer may allege contributory negligence
on the employee's part (a concept until recently forgotten) is also
raised. Finally, the issue is created of whether the use of compara-
tive negligence principles in this context would be sensible, since
the apparent purpose of the proceeding is only to establish the ba-
sis of a subrogation claim-not to affect a loss-sharing as intended
by the Pennsylvania comparative negligence statute. Regardless of
the nature and parameters of the undefined "separate proceeding"
suggested by Justice Larsen, the one certain thing it would accom-
plish would be to bring "the employer squarely back into the
courtroom, even though one purpose of the workers' compensation
law . . . is to keep him out of it.
' 174
173. See Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d at 166 (Rosenn, J., dissenting)
(if no joinder allowed, "a separate subrogation action between employer and employee...
would result in two trials instead of one."). See also Tsarnas, 262 Pa. Super. at 441 n.4, 396
A.2d at 1253 n.4. (Spaeth, J., dissenting) (if there is held to be no automatic subrogation
and no joinder, "the injured employee would have a financial incentive to resist the em-
ployer's subrogation claim at a second trial at which the employer's negligence would be in
issue."). See also Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, supra note 10 at 732-33.
174. See Epstein, supra note 51, at 472. Besides pointing out how inconsistent the
demand for a separate judicial proceeding is with the purpose behind workmen's compensa-
tion, Professor Epstein seems wary of systems which would try to apportion employer fault
on a comparative negligence basis:
[T]he principles needed to determine the employer's degree of negligence and its
causal effects are, at best, difficult to define and apply. Many products liability cases
involve the use of strict liability theories, and it is difficult to know how the strict
liability of the third party is to be "compared" with the negligence of the employer.
Again, the case patterns in which these issues are apt to be raised resist the easy
definition and classification that might permit the cheap and effective disposition of
claims. How do we compare the employer's failure to repair and maintain a product,
with the manufacturer's responsibility for its defective design? Or how do we com-
pare the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings to the workers with the
employer's modification of the product? There are no good, predictable answers
Id. at 471-72.
The judicial waste that would be incurred by requiring a separate, litigated subrogation
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As Judge Spaeth has pointed out, there could be no conceivable
economic benefit achieved from the passage of section 303(b) un-
less the employer's right to subrogation is held to be automatic." 5
Since Justice Larsen was evidently convinced of the underlying ec-
onomic rationale of the statute, it is inconsistent for the argument
to appear that a whole new form of litigation is required thereun-
der. To successfully advocate a separate proceeding would, in the
words of Judge Spaeth, effectively remove "even the possibility of
any cost-savings from the passage of § 481(b)." 176
D. Subrogation and Safety Incentives
Although the Pennsylvania courts in their criticism of the policy
created in Heckendorn rarely broached the subject, the allowing of
the employer to subrogation without a determination of fault has
been attacked from the standpoint of workplace safety and em-
ployer incentives. Professor Epstein, in the course of proposing a
statute which includes the abolition of all employer subrogation,
states the problem as follows:
[E]ven when there is arguably no employer negligence, the statute will have
the beneficial effect of inducing greater investment in accident protection
on the employer's part. The point here is quite crucial because one of the
unfortunate effects of the workers' compensation law is that its relatively
low benefit structure tends to encourage an underinvestment in safety by
employers who are insulated from the full cost of work injury.'
7 7
This proposal, of course, is premised on the assumption that if
the employer knows that he can be reimbursed for the cost of acci-
dents by way of subrogation, no motive will be possess to maintain
a safe workplace. If true, this exception to subrogation is well
taken, since an essential purpose of workmen's compensation, with
its no-fault employer liability, is to encourage industrial and work-
proceeding has also been recognized by courts which, not surprisingly, favored employer
joinder:
Judicial resources are [thereby] used more effectively. The alternative, a separate
subrogation action between employer and employee, would result in two trials instead
of one .... A just result is more likely to be produced if all of the parties are
forcedto present their versions of the incident in a single action before the same
factfinders. And finally, potential problems resulting from inconsistent verdicts, or
from attempts to assert collateral estoppel offensively, are avoided.
Hamme, 716 F.2d at 166 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
175. Tsarnas, 262 Pa. Super. at 441 n.4, 396 A.2d at 1253 n.4 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
176. Id.




Current Pennsylvania compensation rates, however, are not so
low as to impel the conclusion that employers take a frivolous view
towards workplace safety. One commentator, in arguing against
joinder of the employer in products liability 402A actions, has as-
serted that the best way to encourage industrial safety is not to
reduce the manufacturer or supplier's liability, but to raise work-
men's compensation rates, precisely as Pennsylvania has done:
Substantially enlarged workmen's compensation benefits would tend to
stimulate all employers toward greater sensitivity to employee safety. Eco-
nomics would dictate that greater care toward assuring a safe working place
would be good business practice for all employers, whether or not employee
tort actions growing out of work-connected injuries seemed likely. 79
Even if one accepts the assertion that workmen's compensation
rates are so low that they cause an underinvestment in safety, how-
ever, it must still be questioned whether the employer truly feels
any benefit from his ability to be subrogated that would influence
its behavior in the direction of diminished safety. There is enough
transaction cost in obtaining subrogation to employee recoveries
that the employer cannot be imagined to take such a simple view
as Professor Epstein suggests.
The share of attorneys' fees which the employer must bear in the
employee's third party action is the most striking transaction cost
which works to undercut Professor Epstein's "indifference
model."180 Where, for example, the employee's recovery is not
greater than the amount of workmen's compensation payments
theretofore made-or for which the employer will be liable in the
future-the employer bears the total amount of its employee's at-
178. See Epstein, supra note 159, at 801. Although one normally associates the safety
incentive utility of workmen's compensation systems with the employer's behavior, Profes-
sor Epstein makes the interesting observation that, at least historically, "[t]he low awards
[of compensation benefits] create additional incentives upon the worker for self-protection
.... " Id. (emphasis added).
179. Seidelson, supra note 142, at 389. The National Commission, though advocating
that the safety objective of workmen's compensation should be achieved by way of affording
attractive insurance rates to employers with good safety records, was not in disagreement
with Professor Seidelson's proposal:
Because of the interrelationships among the objectives of workmen's compensation,
our recommendations [concerning the income maintenance and effective delivery
goals of the system], if adopted, will automatically strengthen incentives to safety
inherent in merit-rating. As noted before, if our recommendations for adequate bene-
fits are adopted, the stimulus to safety for many employers will significantly increase.
REORT, supra note 16, at 98.
180. See PA. STAT. ANN tit. 77 § 671 (Purdon 1983), cited in full, supra note 4.
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torneys' fees.181 When this statutorily required cost is coupled with
those which the employer (or its insurance carrier) must incur in
its own behalf in pursuing the subrogation claim, it is difficult to
accept that subrogation plays an active role in cultivating indiffer-
ence to safety considerations.
Applying such a purely economic analysis to the incentives to
industrial safety, additionally, ignores the considerable governmen-
tal intervention in the field, most evident in the broad range of
activities carried on by the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration.182
In sum, if subrogation is to be limited or eliminated, it must be
accomplished pursuant to equitable arguments, although shown to
be flawed, because the safety incentive objection appears
unmerited.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Roberts' holding in Heckendorn that the negligence of
the employer is irrelevant at both the subrogation stage of work-
mens' compensation proceedings and in the course of the third-
party action, issued on top of the previous legislative prohibition of
employer joinder, securely grounds the argument that the em-
ployer is achieving "too absolute a victory" in employee third-
party actions. Beyond providing a basis for this complaint, how-
ever, the argument is fraught with infirmity: when viewed in the
broad context of workmen's compensation policy, strict liability
theory, and the current perilous economic health of Pennsylvania,
the "too absolute a victory" cry loses its attraction.
Whether the employer is conclusively free from liability, either
to the extent of its compensation lien or to the extent of its de
facto negligence, should no longer be at issue after Heckendorn.
Still, the persistence of Justice Larsen's anomalous concurrences at
least raises the question of how the lower courts will rule in the
future."' In the presence of Justice Roberts' mandatory language,
181. See Gold Star Service, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 21 Pa.
Commw. 1, 342 A.2d 459 (1975). See also Soliday v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 187 Pa. Super.
44, 142 A.2d 425 (1958)(employer liable for proportionate share of attorneys' fees based on
amount of payments recouped and on amount of total future liability). Cf. Fidler v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Board (United Cable Corp.), No. 186 C.D. 1983 (Pa. Commw.
June 11, 1984)(Judge Barbieri citing Soliday with approval).
182. Cf. REPORT, supra note 16, at 92-93 (reviewing role and interaction of OSHA and
state agencies with workmen's compensation programs).
183. Without citing any of Justice Larsen's concurrences, one superior court panel has
recently produced language concerning the liability of the employer which seems oblivious
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however, there can be no proper judicial conclusion reached but
that the employer is free from liability and is affirmatively entitled
to subrogation.
In consideration of whether freeing the employer from liability
produced an "unjust victory", the courts all too often washed their
hands of the matter and directed the critics of the rule to the legis-
lature. As a matter of judicial treatment of statutes, this behavior
was entirely proper, but such an approach has left the legal com-
munity without an adequately articulated rationale for both the
promulgatory motive of section 303(b), and the continued propri-
ety of the statute as interpreted in Heckendorn. In declaring that
the employer has won only a justifiable victory (while in the midst
of losing other battles),18" the writer hopes that this comment has
provided such a rationale.
David B. Torrey
to the import of Heckendorn as interpreted herein. See Fidler v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board (United Cable Corp.), No. 186 C.D.' 1983 (Pa. Commw. June 11, 1984). In
Fidler, the claimant asserted that the referee had erred in not considering the issue of em-
ployer negligence, since the latter "could have been held responsible to the third-party for
an amount equal to the employer's liability under the Act if the fact-finder determined that
its negligence contributed to the Claimant's injury.. . ." Id. (citing Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa.
180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940)). In denying this allegation of error, the court first correctly stated
that the issue of negligence was outside the referee's jurisdiction, but then made the star-
tling statement that "[o]bviously, the time for claimant to have raised the issue of the em-
ployer's negligence was in the trial court proceeding before, or as a part of, the third-party
settlement." Id. Following as it does the claimant's assertion of employer liability, the infer-
ence is inescapable that the court is passively recognizing that the employer may in some
way still be liable-that is,that the old "Pennsylvania Rule" is alive and well. Such a conclu-
sion, of course, is prohibited by Heckendorn.
184. See infra note 137.
